Presents an original theoretical system to explain and contrast modernism and postmodernism.

The gives the detailed analysis of the ratio of freedom and imagination in an unpublished manuscript written by F.V.Y. Schelling, which contains the materials for the lecture course read at Erlangen University in 1820-1821. The author focuses on the question of imagination as a condition for the possibility to unfold the modal differences that provide the hierarchy of predicative definitions. The article shows that both the draft philosophy of mythology and the philosophy of revelation are a direct continuation of the (...) transcendentalist program given by Kant.Those projects bases on the thesis that the consciousness of freedom and consciousness of the law, justified in the “Critique of Practical Reason”, are related one another. Schelling following Kant’s theory, points to the law and to the unconditional imperative of freedom as the main principle which is not only theoretical or practical, but determines the separation of ontological and deontological modalities. At the same time, the formal structure of an imperative as a command has the specific character of “hiden opening”: what is themed in an imperative is not opened as a meaningful opportunity, it is only opened as theopportunity in its difference from necessity. I show in this article that interpreting the Schelling possibility relies on the teachings of I. Kant in his transcendental idealconception, connected with Kant's interpretation of the imagination’s productive ability. In the middle of Schelling’s theological interpretation of Kant's consciousness of lawdoctrine as the “fact of mind” lies the analogy between peacemaking and the ancestral sin of the first people. This concept is the main source of the theory of potency as ontological modalities, developed by Schelling in the 1830s - 1840s in lectures on the philosophy of mythology and the philosophy of revelation. (shrink)

A considerable increase in interest in Soviet philosophy has been observable of late in the capitalist countries. There are various reasons for this. Some seek to understand its meaning so as to define their attitudes toward it, while others find it of interest for entirely different reasons — a target of criticism.

J. T. Hooker argues that at Il. 24.649 πικερτομων must mean ‘taunting’ and, since ‘taunting’ makes no sense, that πικερτομων must have entered our Iliad at this point from a version of the Iliad slightly different from ours in which it did make sense. I wish to argue that πικερτομων has a meaning different from ‘taunting’, which makes good sense of this, and every other, context.

The philosopher dealing with problems of the epistemology and logic of scientific knowledge cannot disregard those truly immense changes that have occurred in science in the present century. Moreover, he must interest himself not only in what has been learned in the objective world that is new, but by what new methods and means this knowledge has been acquired, how its structure has changed, what categories define the essence of contemporary scientific theorizing, and its outreach into cognition in the future. (...) Of course, the character, structure, and methods of the scientific acquisition of knowledge are determined in the final analysis by what it is that is being cognized, what things and processes are coming to be known. However, direct influence upon logical concepts in the theory of knowledge is brought to bear in the very process of cognition, in its methods and means of approaching the reflection of the object. (shrink)